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Abstract
Background: Changes in third party financing, whether public or private, are linked to a household’s ability to
access dental care. By removing costs at point of purchase, changes in financing influence the need to reach into
one’s pocket, thus facilitating or limiting access. This study asks: How have historical changes in dental care
financing influenced household out-of-pocket expenditures for dental care in Canada?
Methods: This is a mixed methods study, comprised of an historical review of Canada’s dental care market and an
econometric analysis of household out-of-pocket expenditures for dental care.
Results: We demonstrate that changes in financing have important implications for out-of-pocket expenditures:
with more financing come drops in the amount a household has to spend, and with less financing come
increases. Low- and middle-income households appear to be most sensitive to changes in financing.
Conclusions: Alleviating the price barrier to care is a fundamental part of improving equity in dental care in
Canada. How people have historically spent money on dental care highlights important gaps in Canadian dental
care policy.
Background
Equity in dental care use has recently gained more pro-
minence as a health policy issue in Canada and in other
OECD nations [1-5]. Among these countries, Canada
ranks second last in the public financing of dental care
[6]. As opposed to its national system of public health
insurance, dental care in Canada is almost wholly pri-
vately financed, with approximately 60% of dental care
paid through employment-based insurance, and 35%
through out-of-pocket expenditures [7,8]. Of the
approximately 5% of publicly financed care that remains,
most has focused on socially marginalised groups (e.g.
low income children and adults), and is supported by
different levels of government depending on the group
insured [9].
In this context, Canadian governments are now being
asked to respond to historical and emerging issues in
access to dental care [9]. Significant inequalities in oral
health and access to care are long-standing and well
documented [8,10]. It is known that socially marginalised
groups experience disproportionate levels of oral disease,
illness, and disability, and are the least likely to visit a
dentist or have dental insurance. New populations and
access problems are also appearing, such as ‘the working
poor’, who do not qualify for public insurance, yet do not
have jobs that offer employment-based insurance, again
the country’s dominant form of financing care [11,12].
Further, it is anecdotally reported that in light of the
recent global economic downturn, middle-income
families are now contacting local public health agencies
in an effort to access publicly financed care.
Overall, Canada’s dental care system has been defined
as inequitable on a variety of fronts. For example, as
Leake [13] has stressed, Canada’s dental care system is a
clear example of ‘the inverse care law,’ where the people
that need the most care receive the least. Allin [14],
using the horizontal index approach (which tests the
horizontal version of the equity principle, requiring that
people in equal need of care are treated equally, irre-
spective of characteristics such as income, place of resi-
dence, race, etc.), has demonstrated that Canada’s dental
care system is ‘pro-rich,’ confirming that in all of its ten
provinces, the probability of visiting a dentist is much
higher for those with the least need. Similar work by
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ranks among the poorest performers among OECD
nations in this regard. Allin [14] also notes that the
main contributors to inequity in dental care are income
and dental insurance coverage. Lastly, the nature of den-
tal care financing in Canada has also been heavily criti-
cized relative to its shortcomings in the face the policy
push towards health care equity [13]. As mentioned,
dental care is predominantly financed through
employer-employee arrangements. These ‘non-wage
benefits’ are tax subsidized by governments, meaning
that these benefits do not attract income tax. This
results in a situation where those with the least amount
of need and economic barriers to care pay for care with
pre-tax dollars, while those with the most need and the
greatest economic barriers (i.e. low-income and no
employer provided dental insurance) pay with after tax
dollars. In short, the poor to some extent subsidize the
rich [13].
This paper presents another way of exploring the issue
of equity in dental care through the use of Engel curves,
a way of demonstrating how the quantity demanded of
a good or service changes as income level changes. In
one sense, Engel curves are an indirect assessment of
equity in financing, and how this relates to access to
dental care, specifically in terms of how affordability
influences the ability of people to access care. This ana-
lysis is predicated on one general assumption, that
household spending is related to access through the
issue of affordability. By removing costs at point of pur-
chase, changes in third party financing, whether public
or private, influence the need to reach into one’s pocket,
thus facilitating or limiting access to care.
Yet what is the connection between third party finan-
cing, out-of-pocket expenditures, and access to dental
care? While it may appear reasonable to assume that
policy changes in third party financing impact out-of-
pocket expenditures, this does necessarily mean impacts
on access. In fact, Leake and Birch [10] note that while
removing ‘the price barrier to care’ is a necessary step
towards improving access to dental care, it is not suffi-
cient, as access also depends on such things as provider
availability, consumer behaviour, and third party fee
arrangements. Nevertheless, the connection is a close
one. For example, in Canada, it is known that cost con-
sistently ranks as the second most prevalent reason for
not visiting a dentist, and first for those with no dental
insurance [8]. It is also known that the financing of den-
tal care through public or private insurance represents a
strong determinant of dental care utilization [8,16]. It
makes sense to argue that household out-of-pocket
expenditures for dental care represent a marker for
insurance, meaning that the more insurance a household
has, the less of a share of its budget it needs to commit
to dental care. One can further argue that in an insur-
ance rich market, such as Canada, out-of-pocket expen-
ditures can represent a reasonable proxy of access, in
that the more a household has to spend, the more diffi-
c u l ti tm a ya c t u a l l yb et oa c c e s sc a r e ,a l lt h i n g sb e i n g
equal.
Recent data from Locker et al. [17] suggest that the
presence of third party financing substantially reduces,
yet does not entirely eliminate financial barriers to den-
tal care (as measured by a series of questions, “In the
past three years...has the cost of dental care been a
financial burden to you?...have you delayed or avoided
going to a dentist because of the cost?...have you been
unable to have all of the treatment recommended by
your dentist because of the cost?”). For the lowest
income group and those who paid out-of-pocket, the
most common concern expressed was the financial bur-
den imposed by the costs of dental care. For the highest
income group and those with private insurance cover-
age, not being able to have all the treatment recom-
mended by a dentist was the most frequently expressed
concern. At minimum, what this tells us is that third
party financing influences how deeply individuals must
reach into their pockets to pay for dental care, thus pro-
moting or limiting access to care generally and
specifically.
These ideas are corroborated in studies of access to
health and dental care in other international contexts.
For example, Berk and Schur [18] demonstrated that in
the United States, it is the uninsured that report a finan-
cial inability to access health and dental care, more so
than those with public (Medicaid) or private insurance.
Long [19] also showed that in one state, after the
restoration of dental and other health benefits through
M e d i c a i d ,t h e r ec a m ead r o pi nt h es h a r eo fa d u l t s
reporting high out-of-pocket costs and problems paying
medical and dental bills, a decrease in those that
reported not accessing dental care because of cost, and
an increase in the number of low-income adults with a
dental care visit. In Thailand, which recently implemen-
ted universal financing for dental care, Somkostra and
Detsomboonrat [20] showed that after implementation,
there was an increased likelihood among the poor for
accessing and utilizing dental services at public and pri-
vate facilities. Conversely, Falkingham [21] demonstrated
that in Tajikistan, which initiated reform to secure
financing for health services through non-budgetary
sources such as voluntary insurance and patient cost-
sharing, such activity has deterred people from seeking
medical assistance and from receiving the most appro-
priate treatment once medical advice has been sought.
Even amongst the third and fourth income quintiles of
Tajikistan households, assets are sold and debt incurred
in order to meet the costs of health and dental care.
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strated that working poor families make important bud-
getary trade-offs, sometimes involving food, in order to
fulfil their dental care needs.
Ultimately, in order to inform policy discussions
around the issue of equity in dental care, this paper
asks: How have historical changes in dental care finan-
cing influenced household out-of-pocket expenditures
for dental care in Canada? At minimum, Engel curves
allow for an assessment of the distributional impacts of
changes in dental care policy on out-of-pocket expendi-
tures, or how households of different levels of affluence
benefit from various policies and programs.
Methods
This is a mixed methods study, comprised of an histori-
cal review of Canada’s dental care market and an econo-
metric analysis of household out-of-pocket expenditures
for dental care. All components received approval from
the University of Toronto’s ethics review board.
Historical review
Changes to the structure of Canada’s dental care market
were established through: 1. A review of the complete
series of the Journal of the Canadian Dental Association
(1935-2008), the Canadian Society for Public Health
Dentistry Journal (1980-1985), and the Canadian Journal
of Community Dentistry (1986-2000); 2. A review of
electronically available governmental and non-govern-
mental documentation (e.g. ministry and departmental
annual reports, scholarly publications).
To describe changes in dental care financing, health
expenditure data from the Canadian Institute for Health
Information and historical population estimates from
Statistics Canada were used to plot per capita dental
care expenditures from 1975-2005 (constant dollars)
nationally. To extend this timeline into the 1960s, esti-
mates within the dental literature were used [23].
Engel curves
To observe the impacts of changes in dental care finan-
cing on out-of-pocket expenditures for dental care,
Engel curves were created. Data on out-of-pocket con-
tributions for dental care from the Survey of Family
Expenditures and the Survey of Household Spending
were used. Both surveys record detailed annual spending
patterns for a nationally representative sample of resi-
dential households in Canada. Data were used for years
1969, 1982, 1992, 1998, and 2003.
Semi-parametric regression models of household out-
of-pocket expenditures for dental care were estimated as
a function of household budget, holding constant other
household characteristics (age, sex, and marital status of
the household head and (log) household size). All
expenditures were adjusted using the national all-item
consumer price index (2002 = 100). Models were esti-






x[i] + u[i], (1)
where dxshare[i] = dental care share of household i’s
budget; budget[i] = the log of household i’s budget, and
f(budget[i]) is an unknown function to be estimated
non-parametrically; beta’ is a set of unknown para-
meters to be estimated; x[i] = a set of characteristics of
household i including the age, sex, and marital status of
the household head and (log) household size; and u[i] =
combined effect of all other factors besides budget[i]
and x[i] on dxshare[i]. Here, the impact of budget[i] on
dxshare[i] is not restricted whereas the impact of x[i] on
dxshare[i] is restricted as per the conventional linear
regression model. The model was estimated using the
procedure recommended by Robinson [24]. One first
estimates beta’ by a) removing the influence of budget[i]
from dxshare[i] and x[i] non-parametrically, resulting in
transformed variables that we will call dxshare*[i] and
x*[i]; and then b) estimating the linear regression of
dxshare*[i] and x*[i]. Second, one then subtracts beta-
hat’x[i] from both sides of equation (1), where betahat’
are the estimated values of beta’. Hence the LHS of
equation (1) becomes dxshare[i]- betahat’x[i]; and bud-
get[i] is the sole explanatory variable. One then esti-
mates the relationship between these two variables using
a local smoothing technique to arrive at the estimate of
f(budget[i]).
Models were estimated separately for each year, allow-
ing us to compare the dental care budget shares of com-
parable households at different points in time. Hence we
could determine how changes in third party coverage
have affected the dental care budget shares of both afflu-
ent households (i.e. those with large household budgets)
and less affluent households. Moreover, we could com-
pare, for a given year, how dental care budget shares var-
ied across affluent and less affluent households.
Results
Changes in public financing
Governmental investments in dental care effectively
began after WWII as part of the rise of the Canadian
welfare state. In 1948, federal ‘health grants’ were made
available to provincial jurisdictions, which included
investments for public dental infrastructure [25]. By
1967, Canada had nationalised hospital and physician
services, giving rise to the country’s national system of
universal health insurance, yet this excluded dental ser-
vices [26]. Dental services were instead publicly insured
in a targeted fashion, specifically for children and those
receiving social transfers (e.g. welfare recipients) [27]. In
Quiñonez and Grootendorst International Journal for Equity in Health 2011, 10:14
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/10/1/14
Page 3 of 9this regard, federal contributions facilitated provincial
investments in children’s and social assistance programs,
delivered directly and/or indirectly. Figure 1 demon-
strates that these investments grew rapidly throughout
the 1960s and 1970s. Comparatively though, Figure 2
demonstrates that Canada’s investments in dental care
were largely based on private financing.
At the height of public financing in the early 1980s,
the public share for dental care stood at approximately
20%, but has since observed a general decline (Figure 1).
This decline was defined by an economic recession in
the early 1980s, followed by another recession in the
mid 1990s, both resulting in major reductions to gov-
ernment financing [9]. Direct delivery programs were
cut, eligibility criteria were stiffened, and the basket of
available services was shrunk.
Throughout this decline, there have been some mod-
est rebounds, almost exclusively in relation to children’s
programs, with more funds made available to increase
fees and/or expand eligibility [9]. For example, the fed-
eral National Child Benefit was introduced in the mid
1990s, which resulted in provincial investments for chil-
dren of low-income families. Other jurisdictions have
also introduced funding for seniors and refugees.
Changes in private financing
The growth of private financing was also linked to the
rise of the welfare state. Prior to 1967, there was little
private dental insurance in Canada, with most private
financing composed of individual out-of-pocket expendi-
tures [23]. Yet with the exclusion of dental services from
the nation’s system of health insurance, the private
financing of dental care took shape. With the growth of
unionization, dental benefit plans became a major part
of employer-employee contracts [27-29]. This was facili-
tated by provincial subsidies in the form of taxation pol-
icy that excluded non-wage benefits such as dental
insurance from payroll taxes [30]. For example, close to
5,000 contracts were in force in 1976, and 18,000 by
1982 [31,32]. These investments are well reflected in
Figure 2 from the 1970s onwards.
The private financing of dental care stuttered with the
economic recession of the 1980s, yet remained in steady
incline. While growth in wages and salaries stagnated,
this did not slow supplementary labour income (non-
wage benefits) [33]. From 1967 to 1989, supplementary
labour income growth rates consistently outranked those
of wages and salaries, almost doubling the share of total
compensation from 5% to 10%. Also, the share of supple-
m e n t a r yl a b o u ri n c o m em a d eu pb yd e n t a lp l a n sr o s e
consistently, from 23.8% in 1967 to 30% in 1989.
Yet by the 1990s recession, employment-based insur-
ance began to suffer. Canadian firms began to search for
ways to cost-contain, and benefit plans were changed to
limit annual maximums and services, and/or by introdu-
cing or expanding deductibles, co-insurance or co-pay-
ments [34,35]. Preventive services were also ‘bundled’,
so rather than a fee charged for each procedure, a single
relative value was applied to various combinations of
services, reducing the overall fee [35]. ‘Flex benefit
plans’ were also introduced, which no longer defined
maximums for a set of benefits (e.g. dental, vision, sup-
plementary medical), but instead allowed employees to
choose the type and amount of coverage desired from a
variety of services [36]. This allowed employers to pro-
vide more and different services, while limiting increases
in expenditures. The volatility in insurance markets dur-
ing this period is observable in Figure 3.
Figure 1 Public per capita dental care expenditures, Canada, 1960-2005 (constant dollars). Source: Historical Statistics of Canada, Social
Science Federation of Canada; National Health Expenditure Database, Canadian Institute for Health Information; National population estimates,
Statistics Canada; Historical inflation rates, Bank of Canada.
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employment in response to economic constraints and
growing global competition [37]. Unionisation slowed,
which had grown from approximately 2 million persons
in 1967 to 3.8 million in 1990, yet totalled 3.5 million
by 1997 [28]. Firms reduced their wage offers to new
employees, and offered temporary jobs to a growing
proportion of new employees. The fraction of new
employees in temporary jobs rose from 11% in 1989 to
21% in 2004. Importantly, part-time and temporary full-
time workers generally receive fewer benefits than regu-
lar full-time workers [38]. Finally, changes have been
differentially distributed in the employee population,
meaning that low and middle-income employees have
Figure 2 Total, private, and public per capita dental care expenditures, Canada, 1960-2005 (constant dollars). Source: Historical Statistics
of Canada, Social Science Federation of Canada; National Health Expenditure Database, Canadian Institute for Health Information; National
population estimates, Statistics Canada; Historical inflation rates, Bank of Canada.
Figure 3 Private health insurance expenditures, annual growth rates, Canada, 1989-2003. Source: National Health Expenditure Database,
Canadian Institute for Health Information.
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tures and non-wage offers [28,37,38].
Impacts on household out-of-pocket expenditures for
dental care
In the earliest year, 1969, there was little private or pub-
lic coverage of dental care services, so that most expen-
ditures were made out-of-pocket. During this time, the
share of the household budget allocated to dental care
was small (less than 1 percent) but nevertheless much
higher for more affluent households. Dental care there-
fore acted like a luxury good. Since 1969 there has been
an expansion of the range and quality of dental care ser-
vices offered, a commensurate increase in their prices,
and increase in third party coverage. Between 1969 and
1982, there was a drop in the dental care budgetary
share of less affluent households - those with budgets
less than $15,000; this is likely due to the expansion of
public dental subsidies for the poor observed in Figure
1. Since 1982, there has been a retrenchment in public
subsidies for the poor, and this would increase their
budget share proportionally if their use of dental care
remained constant. Yet we know that the dental care
services use of less affluent households is particularly
price sensitive so that the reductions in public subsidies
since 1982 has reduced the use of services among such
households and thus also mitigated the post-1982
growth in their budget share.
The situation for more affluent households is different.
Expansion of third party coverage has resulted in a
sharp drop in their budget share up until 1992. The
decline in financial burden of dental care services for
such households is much larger than the decline
observed for less affluent households between 1969 and
1982. There have been slight increases in the budget
share of affluent households since then, likely to do with
the availability of generally uninsured cosmetic proce-
dures and the limits placed on non-wage benefits.
Discussion
Changes in dental care financing are strongly linked to
out-of-pocket expenditures for dental care. This is best
observed in Figure 4 through the two periods compris-
ing 1969 to 1992, where major investments in public
and private financing resulted in clear and logical
impacts to the household budgetary share for dental
care: with more financing came drops to the household
share, and with less financing came increases. The per-
iod 1992 to 1998 is less clear. It is unknown whether
the modest public investments at the time had an
impact, or whether drops in the household share for























































Figure 4 Household budgetary shares for dental care, by household budget, Canada, 1969-2003.N o t e :xa x i si sm e a s u r e di nt h el o g
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from 1998 to 2003 is the least clear for similar reasons,
meaning that a drop for all low-income households is
arguably not explained by the very modest public invest-
ments made at the time, especially in an overall period
of economic decline.
Y e tw h a ti sm o s tc l e a ra b o u tt h eE n g e lc u r v e si st h a t
the magnitude of fluctuations for low to middle income
families is greatest, arguably making these families the
most sensitive to changes in dental care financing. This
idea is supported by recent research into the oral health
and access to care disparities associated with working
poverty in Canada [11,12,22]. Recent data also demon-
strates that when compared to the public and privately
insured, those paying for dental care out-of-pocket are
more likely to report painful aching in their mouths,
and more likely to report staying in bed in the previous
two-weeks because of dental pain [11].
Given this, it is important to consider the central lim-
itation of our analysis. Namely, changes to household
expenditures can be explained by numerous factors: the
presence of third party financing, changes in the share
that an insured household must pay, changes in utilisa-
tion, in pricing, and in general economic conditions.
This means that our interpretations are not considered
causal, but instead are hypothesis generating. We
assume that third party financing influences how deeply
individuals must reach into their pockets to pay for den-
tal care, thus facilitating or limiting access to care. Yet
the obverse may also be true, for example, if providers
plan care in relation to what is covered by an insurance
plan, treatment may involve more extensive services at
greater cost, so the relationship between household
expenditures and access is definitely not clear-cut. This
also depends on the price sensitivity of dental services
use. If a household is very price sensitive then they will
not consume any dental services that costs them money;
we cannot distinguish such a household from one that
h a su s e dal o to fd e n t a ls e r v i c e sw h o s ec o s tw a sp i c k e d
up by a third party. In other words, households with
low dental services expenditures can be quite different.
It is also important to consider international work in
this area, yet from our review, nothing like this exists in
the dental literature. Nevertheless, the use of Engel
curves to explore the impacts of changing social and
economic conditions on the consumption of goods such
as food and pharmaceuticals is well established [39-42].
Engel curves provide useful information regarding con-
sumption patterns across incomes, thus facilitating infer-
ences on the distributional impacts of changing social
conditions.
In terms of the policy implications of our findings, it
is clear that changes in dental care financing are
important for the ability of households to access dental
care. Thus as a policy instrument, removing the price
barrier to care is fundamental [10]. Yet specifically to
Canada, how this price barrier is removed warrants
attention. Leake and Birch [10] state that the net effect
of Canada’s method of financing dental care is a ‘perver-
sion’: since employment based insurance is present for
those with stable jobs and incomes, and since dental
insurance is excluded from payroll taxation, those with
insurance (the rich) pay for dental care using pre-tax
dollars, and those with no insurance (the poor) pay with
after-tax dollars. As stated in our introduction, this
means that the poor in effect subsidise the rich, repre-
senting a damning view of the wealth transfer principle
in the Canadian welfare state as it applies to dental care.
Moreover, in the context of available public insurance,
which is targeted mainly at children, and social policy
that largely functions on the bases of ‘deserving and
undeserving poverty’ [43], this magnifies the need for
public subsidies among working poor families. Policy
leaders should thus pay closer attention to the changing
nature of employment and explore policy and legislative
instruments that aim to secure or promote non-wage
benefits for low income and/or temporary work arrange-
ments. Similarly, low-income programs will need to
broaden their eligibility in order to buffer changing eco-
nomic conditions for families, not just children. These
recommendations also apply to countries that finance
dental care in a similar manner (a combination of
employment-based insurance supplemented by public
subsidies for the poor), in particular the United States,
and to a lesser extent countries such as Belgium, Fin-
land, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and for those
without substantial amounts of employment-based
insurance, but with tax subsidies aimed at promoting
the direct purchase of private dental insurance, such as
Australia, the Netherlands, and France [44,45]. That
said, another way to remove the price barrier to care is
through universal coverage, which in most countries
exists in a targeted approach, such as school based ser-
vices in Chile and Brazil, or dedicated direct delivery
systems such as in the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
Norway [46].
Conclusions
This study has presented a mixed methods approach to
assessing the potential impacts of social, economic, and/
or policy changes on household expenditures for dental
care. There may be much opportunity for this approach
in an international and comparative context. From the
local perspective, this approach ultimately provides deci-
sion-makers with a readily interpretable visual represen-
tation of how historical changes in financing can impact
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dental care in general.
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